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in a scholarly journal in the labor field in many years. We find much to agree with in his remarks; however, 
we also find many areas where we feel he condemns research because of his overly optimistic 
expectations about its ability to contribute to the policy process, and other areas where he appears to be 
unaware that research in labor economics has already contributed fairly directly to policy decisions. 
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COMMENT 
RONALD G. EHRENBKRG, DANIEL S. HAMERMESH, 
and GEORGE E. JOHNSON* 
J O H N DUNLOP has presented what are ccr-
J tainly some of the most provocative re-
marks to appear in a scholarly journal in 
the labor field in many years. Wc find much 
to agree with in his remarks; however, wc 
also find many areas where we feel he con-
demns research because of his overly opti-
mistic expectations about its ability to 
contribute to the policy process, and other 
areas where he appears to be unaware that 
research in labor economics has already 
contributed fairly directly to policy 
decisions. 
Who is right—Keynes or Dunlop? Does 
academic research lead to policy decisions, 
or do academics distill their frenzy from the 
ravings of some very active politicians? In 
many cases Dunlop is clearly correct. The 
surge in interest in the economics of labor 
market discrimination, for example, was 
clearly a result rather than a cause of the 
civil rights movement. Also, interest in the 
economics of trade unions peaked in the 
late 1940s and early 1950s, but it was a 
relatively quiet branch of labor economics 
prior to and even during the late 1930s 
when, of course, fundamental questions 
concerning unionism were being resolved. 
in other cases, however, the causation runs 
*Thc authors arc at Cornell University, Michigan 
State University, and the University of Michigan, 
respectively. Their views have been shaped by their 
experiences at the Office of the Assistant Secretary 
for Policy, Evaluation and Research at the U.S. 
Department of Labor, where Ehrcnhcrg was a con-
sultant, Uamermesh was Director of the Office of 
Research, and Johnson was Director of the Office of 
Evaluation. Johnson is currently on leave as a senior 
stair economist at the Council of Economic Advisers. 
-—EDITOR. 
the other way. The current push for deregu-
lation has its intellectual foundations in 
the huge accumulation of prior work on the 
effects of government regulation on the op-
eration of markets. Similarly, the public's 
apparent decreased tolerance for high un-
employment (as compared to that during 
the years before 1940) probably stems from 
the recognition, based on the work of 
Keynes and his successors, that deep depres-
sions arc avoidable. Thus, the truth lies 
somewhere between the positions of Keynes 
and Dunlop on this issue. Ideas afTect policy 
and vice versa, and variable lags operate 
in each part of this feedback process. 
The de rigueur ending of the Ph.D. thesis 
or young labor economist's article—"Con-
clusions and Policy Implications"—repre-
sents as Dunlop implies, either extreme 
naivete, extreme egotism, or both. One can-
not expect ideas to leap from the pages of 
The American Economic Review, this jour-
nal, or even the Brookings Papers on Eco-
nomic Activity into bills being signed on 
national television by the President. Policy 
making is an inchoate process, and econo-
mists—even labor economists—have an 
effect on this process in their professional 
capacity. Wc will argue that this has been 
true even in two of the cases in which 
Dunlop does not find any effect. 
For many purposes it is convenient to 
divide the labor field into three parts: (A) 
the analysis of individual collective bargain-
ing situations, or industrial relations; (B) 
the theory of labor market intervention, or 
applications of microeconomics to labor 
market analysis; and (G) the theory of ag-
gregate labor market behavior, or applica-
lndustritd and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 31, No. 1 (October 1977). © 1977 by Cornell University. 
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lions ol macroeconomics. In broad terms we 
interpret Dunlop as saying that A should 
be the prime concern of labor economists 
and that the research under C (the Phillips 
Curve maze) is not relevant for influencing 
outcomes under A. Furthermore, by impli-
cation, B is also irrelevant for A. We feel 
that Dunlop's attack on C is unfair and 
that he completely ignores B—the area in 
which most of the good work in labor eco-
nomics over the past fifteen years has been 
done. 
The analysis of the relationship between 
inflation and unemployment lias admittedly 
(lowed into many backwaters that have had 
a singular lack of influence on policy. This 
has been due either to the narrow technical 
nature or the sheer silliness of the policy 
implications drawn in these analyses.1 The 
mainstream of research on this subject, 
however, beginning with Phillips' seminal 
paper, has washed the entire policy debate 
along in its flow. Before lilfiO discussion of 
macroeconomic policy did not center 
around the tradeoffs; since then, as we saw 
in the 1976 Presidential campaign, the 
major focus has been the choice between 
stimulating the economy to lower unem-
ployment and letting things slide to avoid 
touching off more rapid inflation. The 
obverse of this debate was clear in the popu-
lar discussion of President Nixon's economic 
policies in 19fi9. More recently, the notion 
of a vertical Phillips Curve has entered the 
popular debate, providing at the present 
time an intellectual basis for proponents of 
more rapid economic growth and opponents 
of seemingly-free lunch programs such as 
Humphrey-Hawkins. No doubt, now that 
these ideas have been explained by the edi-
tors of Business Week and the Wall Slreel 
Journal, their effect on the policy debate 
will be enhanced still further. 
Dunlop docs not view this research as a 
"useful contribution to policy making" 
'For example, Perry's results on the "effects" of 
profit rates on wage inllation led some economists 
to advocate a profits tax as a means of controlling 
cost-push inflation, Fortunately, given that tlic basis 
of this policy proposal was the weak aggregative 
evidence provided by Perry and others, it had little 
effect on actual policy formulation, and profit rates 
have, of course, long since been dropped from 
aggregate wage equations. 
primarily because it cannot be used in set-
ting up systems of wage controls. But the 
purpose of the Phillips Curve literature was 
to investigate the nature of the inflation-
ary constraint on macroeconomic policy, not 
to devise the perfect control system.2 Thus, 
Dunlop's criticism of the Phillips Curve 
literature is both unfair and misdirected. 
Dunlop ignores a host of areas in which 
labor economists have done very solid work 
that has in turn had a direct influence on 
policy. One such example is the continuing 
debate over the desirability of a high legal 
minimum wage. For decades economists 
have been pointing out that although a 
high minimum wage will make marginal 
(i.e., teenage and female) workers better off 
per unit of time, it will diminish the num-
ber of jobs for such workers. Thus, a high 
minimum wage is likely to exacerbate the 
unemployment problem for those who 
suffer the highest unemployment rates. As a 
result of the publication of some recent 
technical papers (using a wide range of 
modern techniques), the economic effects of 
high minimum wages have come to be 
recognized by opinion leaders (the New 
York Times wrote recently of the "mini-
mally useful minimum wage") and policy 
makers (the Carter Administration held the 
line at a minimum wage of S2.65 when 
§3.00 was anticipated). 
The amorphous field called human cap-
ital theory has so many facets that it is 
easy to claim a lack of relevance for policy 
despite the strenuous efforts of so many 
researchers. Economic policy has (quite 
rightly) been unaffected by the recent in-
terest in the economics of marriage and 
other aspects of behavior previously the 
province of sociologists and demographers. 
Similarly, the substantial work designed to 
pin down definitively the fourth derivative 
of the age-earnings profile has not had a 
discernible effect on legislation, program 
administration, or the general policy debate. 
Nonetheless, the development of the view 
of training as an investment—of forgone 
current earnings and later returns of 
^Indeed, the clear implication of most modern 
wage determination models is that the optimal wage 
control policy in a U.S.-style economy is no policy 
at all. 
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differentially higher earnings—has affected 
the way noncconomisls think about labor 
market policy. In the narrowest sense this 
effect has been manifested in the (often mis-
guided) concern with measurement of rates 
of returns. More broadly, it has shifted the 
focus of the discussion of manpower policy 
away from training programs solely as a 
redistribuiivc device and toward viewing 
them as investments that increase the 
amount of resources in the economy. Here 
again, the chief effect has been the general-
ized change in the way policy is considered, 
not any immediate policy change that 
flowed from some specific piece of research. 
Human capital theory has been increas-
ingly utilized in a number of specific situa-
tions, however. Evaluations of the impact 
of programs for affirmative action and occu-
pational safety and health, among many 
others, make use of micro wage equations 
that were developed on the basis of the 
human capital literature. Moreover, there 
is an enormous potential for human capital 
models to be used in individual collective 
bargaining situations. It could be argued, 
for example, thai public utilities should not 
be allowed to pass excessive labor cost in-
creases on to consumers and that this ques-
tion should be analyzed in the context of 
human capital models. Moreover, human 
capital analysis is used widely in litigation 
involving wrongful death or injury, and it 
is likely that in the future even some of 
the more obscure aspects of the theory (like 
hedonic prices and the economics of mar-
riage) will have legal applications. 
Despite these areas of success there is 
room for improvement, and there are direc-
tions research can take that will make it 
both more useful and intellectually more 
satisfying. The most important of these 
directions is toward the need to integrate a 
knowledge of institutions with the work 
done by analytical labor economists. Too 
often we have been content to derive our 
hypotheses and estimate our regressions in 
at least a partial vacuum of knowledge 
about the institutions with which we deal. 
Similarly, institutional economists have too 
often concentrated on the detailed descrip-
tion of the institutions and the presentation 
of case studies and paid little attention to 
how these institutions affect the workings 
of the labor market and the economic 
agents within that market. Although we do 
not wish to proclaim a plague on both 
houses, each could benefit by accepting the 
good points of the other's approach. 
It is unfair, however, to expect that those 
who have the requisite quantitative skills to 
be successful modern economists will also 
have time to learn about all the institutions 
associated with each topic they research. In 
some areas—unemployment insurance is a 
good example—the institutions are so com-
plex and detailed that the effort required 
to gain anything approaching complete 
knowledge of the institution is sufficient to 
preclude the analysis of the economics of 
the institution by most economists. There-
fore, the careful analytical labor economist 
must develop the judgment to decide what 
institutional knowledge is worth acquiring, 
just as he must decide what abstractions to 
make in modeling the phenomena that con-
cern him. 
Better data arc an important need of an-
alytical labor economics, both to increase 
its relevance to policy and to make it more 
satisfying intellectually. Better data do not 
mean more data, though. The government 
now produces huge collections of statistics 
that have little use for policy and even less 
use in enabling us to understand how the 
world works. The payoff to data collection 
has not been high for academic economists, 
but it has not been zero (One need only cite 
the OEO-ISR and Panics longitudinal data 
sets as examples). What is important is that 
economists who engage in data collection 
must operate as economists and have ex-
plicit notions of how the data arc to be 
used. Otherwise, more useless data will be 
collected and the information needed to 
answer questions of policy interest will not 
be produced. 
Other areas that Dunlop views as fruitful 
for economists—knowledge of organiza-
tions, their decision-making processes, and 
their international interdependence, in par-
ticular—require so much detailed work out-
side of economics as to deter the economist 
from doing labor economics. These are ex-
amples of cases in which the disciplines 
should not be allowed to cross-sterilize. The 
complexities of the issue require a division 
of labor that likely precludes the economist 
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from a central role, unless, of course, one 
views economics as an imperialistic disci-
pline that should expand to all areas of 
policy inquiry.3 
While labor economics has had more im-
pact than Dunlop admits, there are impedi-
ments to its achieving a greater impact. 
First, in academic labor economics, the 
simple idea, appropriately dressed up with 
Hamiltonians and several classes of labor, 
is more likely to be published in a leading 
journal than the same idea stated simply 
and fleshed out with some empirical verifi-
cation. This barrier is artificial, since we 
economists ourselves have created it. But 
there are also natural barriers. Too often 
economists who accept policy positions in 
the federal government give no sign that 
they arc economists or that the ideas they 
have studied and expanded upon through-
out their careers have any relevance to their 
policy-making function. Partly this results 
from the crush of affairs, partly from a 
natural desire to be "one of the [policy-
making] boys." Also, great pressure against 
applying the simple analysis of labor eco-
nomics to policy problems often stems from 
bureaucratic and constituent fears that a 
program will be shown to be ineffective or 
even harmful. 
How can these barriers be broken down? 
Wc agree with Dunlop that increasing the 
number of middlemen is not the solution; 
too often these persons are those who could 
not succeed either as academics or as policy 
makers. Dunlop's suggestion that labor 
economists broaden their focus has merit if 
it means we consider some of the more 
relevant, previously ignored economic and 
institutional aspects of the problems. By 
being better economists wc can have a 
greater impact on policy; by branching out 
into the focus and methods of other disci-
plines we may well become second-rate 
sociol 
The average congressman docs not under-
stand differential equations; but to produce 
good analytical economics that can be use-
ful, the labor economist must employ this 
and other arcane aspects of mathematics 
and statistics. He must do more, though, for 
the congressman to understand him: in 
addition to publishing in academic jour-
nals, he must be willing to spend the time 
rewriting his ideas in nontechnical lan-
guage. Occasionally, too, he must broaden 
his focus beyond the narrow object of his 
academic research and consider and com-
ment on the economics of the entire policy 
or program with which his own narrow 
academic research deals. Failing to do this 
leaves the labor economist open to Dun-
lop's charges of usclessncss, and still worse, 
leaves the policy debate open to those who 
ignore its economic aspects. 
One way labor economists can be stimu-
lated to broaden their focus while retaining 
their ability to do analytical labor eco-
nomics is for them to spend a year or two 
in government during the second five years 
of their career. To do so any earlier is 
likely to result in their abandoning an-
alytical labor economics before they have 
developed sufficient skills to enable them to 
produce useful analytical work, while delay 
beyond this means the experience comes 
too late to alter the person's view of re-
search and policy. 
As much as wc would like our ideas to be 
heeded, wc should not expect economics to 
be the major determinant of all labor mar-
ket policy. There arc, after all, relatively 
few economists, and we arc but one voice 
of many seeking to influence policy.4 But 
with a litlc more effort to sell our ideas our 
influence can be increased slightly, and we 
can do so without sacrificing what has al-
ready proven a very useful approach to 
problems of labor market policy. 
•iPci-haps the most valuable point an economist 
can contribute in the creation of organizational 
structures is that a system must possess incentives 
for the desired policies to be carried out. The 
CETA system, for example, was set up with a weak 
set or incentives, and its resultant failure was easily 
predictable. 
i.Sliglcr has recently pointed out that if econ-
omists were so extremely valuable to society, 
surely the market would have led to a large expan-
sion beyond our current numbers. That this has 
not occurred, and that we are expanding only 
slightly more rapidly than all other occupations is 
a good indicator of our value lo society—increas-
ingly useful, but not <|iiile so prized as wc might 
hope. 
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